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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS lHAXYVELL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.

JOIIN ,V. TUUNER, \Varden,
Utah .State Prison,

I
\

)

Case No.
10924

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEl\1ENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Dennis Maxwell, appeals from the
denial of the relief prayed for in his petition for a 'Vrit
of Habeas Corpus.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The appellant filed his petition for a 'Vrit of
Habeas Corpus in the District Court of the Second
I

Judicial District, in and for 'y eber County. A hearing
was held on April 24th, 1967, before the Honorable
Charles G. Cowley, judge presiding. Appellant was
present in person and by his counsel, Paul D. Vernieu.
Testimony was taken. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court having found no evidence of any impropriety
resulting in appellant's entering a plea of guilty to the
charge, entered an order denying the relief prayed
for in the Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed.
STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS
On or about January 10th, 1962, appellant was the
subject of a burglary investigation by Weber County
Sheriff, Leroy Hadley (Tr. 5) . The initial in terrogation in this matter took place at appellant's home (Tr.
5, 49) . After talking to him in his home, the sheriff
decided to take appellant into custody (Tr. 10). Appellant was then taken to the jail in Ogden, along
with a hi-fi set that was part of the property involved
in the burglary under investigation. He appeared the
following morning in the city court and was charged
with second degree burglary (Tr. 7, 52). At his appearance in the city court, appellant requested time to
retain counsel and the case was set over so that he might
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Jo so (Tr. 7). Immediately following his appearance

iu the city court, appellant posted his bail and then went
to the sheriff's office for further investigation (Tr.
8, 52). The appellant's appearance in the city court
awl his subsequent meeting- with Sheriff Hadley occurred on the same day, on or about January 11th,
1962.

Appellant's next court appearance was in the
District Court for the Second Judicial District on
February 5, 1962 (Tr. 24). He had not retained
eounsel in the interim, apparently having decided to
plead guilty. On that date, appeilant was advised of
his right to counsel. He was examined thoroughly by
the court as to whether or not he wanted counsel (Tr.
:25). He then knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to counsel (Tr. 25). The court then informed
him that it would not be necessary for him to enter a
plea at that time. However, appellant preferred to
waiYe the waiting period and entered a plea of guilty
to the charge of second degree burglary (Tr. 26, 27).
Sentencing was postponed pending investigation by
the Utah State Board of Adult Probation and Parole
(Tr. 28).
The defendant appeared in the district court for
sentencing on February 19th, 1962, at which time he
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the period
provided by law. Other pertinent facts will be mentioned in the argument portion of this brief.
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ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE RECORD REVEALS XO EYIDEXCE
THAT APPELLANT'S "TAIYER OF COGNSEL AND ENTRY OF A PLEA OF GCILTY
WAS THE RESULT OF I)IPROEER COERCION, l\IISREPRESENTATIOX, OR IXDCCEMENT ON TH~ PART OF LA"T EXFORCEl\1ENT OFFICIALS.
Both of appellant's arguments, viz., that he was
denied the right to counsel, and that he was improperly
induced to enter a plea of guilty, are predicated 011
his allegations that statements made by John Holmes,
a probation officer, and Sheriff Hadley, caused appellant to believe he would get probation in return for
his plea of guilty. Thus, his two arguments resoln into
a question of whether or not such inducement did, in
fact, occur.
Respondent submits that John Holmes, the probation officer, could have had nothing to do with inducing appellant to plead guilty. It is conclusively established in the record that appellant entered his plea of
guilty on February 5th, 1962 (Tr. 24). Reason tells
us that any inducement would have to occur prior to the
time of the entry of a plea. Yet, appellant admits on
cross-examination that he did not talk to John Holmes
prior to February 5th.

Q. (By l\Ir. X ewey) So John Holmes certainly
couldn't have induced you to plead guilty when
4

you didn't talk to him about the case until after
you had entere<l your plea on February 5th;
isn't that true?
A. Yes, sir. (Tr. 31)

*

*

*

Q. After February 5th that you talked to Mr.
Ilolmes. So that anything ~Ir. Holmes said
couldn't liave induced you to plead guilty; isn't
that true?
A.

Uh, huh. (Tr. 34)

Respondent submits that for this reason the allegation that appellant was induced to plead guilty by
John Holmes has no basis in fact and is therefore
\rithout merit. In view of this admission, this court
need not consider the possibility of inducement by
,)fr. Holmes.
There remains then, only the possibility that Sheriff
Leroy Hadley could have influenced appellant to enter
his plea of guilty. Respondent submits that if, in fact,
appellant was wrongly induced to enter his plea of
guilty, a release on habeas corpus would be appropriate. Behrens v. Hironimus, 166 F.2d 245 (4th Cir.
mets); Piner v. United States, 222 F.2d 199 (7th Cir.
19.35). However, the burden of proving the inducement rests on the petitioner for habeas corpus. Behrens
t'. Hirunimus, 170 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1948); Gensbur,q
r. Smith, 35 'Vash. 2d 849, 215 P.2d 880 (1950), cert.
den. :~40 U.S. 83.5 (1950). If the petitioner in a habeas
eorpus petition urging wrongful inducement of his plea
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fails to prove that allegation, the writ will not he
granted.
There is a presumption that the proceedings as
shown by the record at the time of conviction were
regular. United States ex rel Giesel v. Claudy, 96 F.
Supp. 201 CYV.D. Pa. 1951) ; Hall v. Edmondson,
177 Kan. 404, 279 P .2d 290 ( 1955). In order to warrant his release on th~ habeas corpus, petitioner must
put in sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption.
Nunn v. Humphrey, 79 F. Sup. 8 (M.D. Pa. 1948);
fVhite v. Hudspeth, 166 Kan. 63, 199 P.2d 518 (1948).
"Tith these rules in mind, respondent submits that appellant has failed in his proof of his allegations of
inducement. It is well settled that the unsupported and
uncorroborated statements of a petitioner in habeas
corpus will not suffice to carry his evidentiary burden.
Kanive v. Hudspeth, 165 Kan. 658, 198 P.2d 162
( 1948). Nowhere in the record is there any testimony
to support petitioner's allegations of inducement. On
the contrary, said allegations are refuted in whole by
hoth John Holmes and Sheriff Hadley. Both the probation officer and Sheriff Hadley flatly denied having
ever made promises of probation to the appellant in
return for a plea of guilty from him (Tr. 46, 61).
If we assume, however, for the purposes of this
argument that Sheriff Hadley did in fact promise the
defendant that he would get probation in exchange
for his plea of guilty. in light of the record here. respollllent submits that this would not have influenced
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ppellaut to enter a plea of guilty. There can be no
,., rongful inducement when the person claiming to have
!wen induced knows as a fact at the time that the person
making a promise has no authority whatsoever to make
:-.uch a promise. Ex parte Hall, 91 Okla. Crim. 11,
n:.i P.~d 587 (1950); State v. Terry, 30 N.J. Super.
:Z~8, 104< A.2d 332 ( 1954); Commonwealth ex rel Campbell v. Ashe, 141 Pa. Super. 408, 15 A.2d 409 (1940).
I 11 this ease, appelJant admits in his testimony at the
hearing that he had knowledge of the fact that the
Sl1criff had no authority to make promises, nor could
he enforce any promises as to whether or not appellant
would receive probation.

;1

Q. (By l\'lr. Newey) Have you been on probation before?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. "Then you were put on probation before,
were you put on probation by the Sheriff?
A. No, sir.

Q. 'Vere you put on probation by the probation
department?
A. No, sir.
(~. 'Vho put you on probation when you went
on before?
A. A judge.
Q. Now did you understand Mr. Hadley to say,
as you say: "Ile promised me definitely that I
would get probation?" You knew Mr. Hndley
didn't giYe prohntion; didn't you?

.r\. This is true. (Tr. 35)
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Thus, it is clearly apparent that even had Sheriff
Hadley made the statements alleged to have been made
by him, appellant was not influenced or induced in any
way, for the reason that he knew that whatever promises
the sheriff might make could not be made authoritatively.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the record on appeal
dearly and adequately refutes all of petitioner's allegations. It could hardly be argued that any statements
b)· John llolmes made after entry of plea had an
effect on appellant's plea. That he could not have been
influenced by John Holmes is all too obvious. With
respect to Sheriff Hadley, it is likewise apparent that
whatever he may have said had no effect on appellant
since he knew that the sheriff had no authority to make
any promises to him. Appellant has based his claim
of coercion on statements made by the probation officer
aud the sheriff at the time of his arrest and conviction.
'Vhen, by his own testimony, appellant clearly and
convincingly disproves his allegations, respondent submi ls that the only course for this court to follow is to
affirm the decision of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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